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Abstract. As we enter the age of decentralization, technological and
political tensions stress the fabric of modern Democracies. Understand-
ing the theoretical and practical challenges that we will be forced to
face is the focus of this project. From the technological choices and their
implementations, passing through their political and philosophical con-
sequences, a new path needs to be drawn in order to understand whether
DLTs will fundamentally change the very concepts of eDemocracy and
governance, or improve existing models.
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1 Problem overview
It goes without saying that Democracy, in order to be effective, needs to ensure
the transparency and auditability of its institutions and their respective rami-
fications’ actions and decision process [10]. The obvious reason for this need is
that, as long as the sovereignty belongs to the people and is exercised by the peo-
ple in the forms and within the limits of each given Constitution [35], the people
must be aware of how the power that they have delegated to the institutions is
being used in order to hold them accountable.
Fortunately, technology nowadays is progressing at an impressive pace and
can be used to empower democratic institutions — and the Public Administra-
tions as their ramification — by making them more accountable to the people by
the means of an increased level of transparency. Public Administrations’ web-
sites for transparency purposes are a good example of that; but still, even though
documents do get published at some point, most of the times the process that
lead to decisions happen behind closed doors. Most importantly, it is not rare
? Copyright c©2020 for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative Com-
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that the administrations disregard the applicable transparency laws and omit
to publish their documents on their respective websites. As long as the admin-
istrations remain in material control of the processes, the ultimate — factual
— decision of when and what to publish is theirs, thus facilitating corruption
events. There are, of course, remedies, but they are in most cases subsequent to
the violations and can be costly.
Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) such as the Blockchain [29] and
Distributed Web Technologies such as IPFS [4] can offer a way of ensuring
the transparency of democratic institutions, representing the texture of an e-
Governance [26] infrastructure on top of which e-Government [23] services can
be built through the automation of processes by the means of Smart Contracts
[11] and/or Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) [41][15]. Moreover,
DLTs can represent a tool that citizens could use to hold institutions and Public
Administrations accountable in a more direct and prompter fashion, narrowing
the margins of corruption events.
However, the adoption of these technologies to such an extent and at a such
high institutional level poses a series of questions that need to be answered —
and this is the purpose of this work: to push further the Digital Single Market
[19] and investigate whether and how it would be possible to build a European
legal and technological framework to empower transparency and combat corrup-
tion via public process automation, reducing the need for bureaucracy, enabling
secure and law-abiding automated interactions between citizens and Public Ad-
ministration [18].
As of now, being still in the preliminary stage of the work, three main ques-
tions arise.
2 Main questions
2.1 The technological choice
What technology should be adopted by a state for eGovernance, with
particular regard to its kernel protocol: a permissioned, state-run DLT
vs a permissionless, community-run DLT.
This question is — without a doubt — the fundamental one. Not only because
it will affect the practical ways of implementation (see last question), but most
most importantly because it could determine a new configuration of checks and
balances, as will be briefly discussed in the next question.
It cannot be ignored that the very reason why the Blockchain was born in
2009 was to give the people the power to operate in a trustless manner through
disintermediation, without the need for institutions [29]. Hence, the adoption of
DLTs at a State level, prima facie, would seem to betray the crypto-anarchist
philosophy that inspired Satoshi Nakamoto 1.
1 It should be sufficient to note that in the Bitcoin whitepaper [29] the first reference is
to http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt [13] and that the first paragraph reads: “I
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Nonetheless, in a Democratic society, the Social Contract that binds its cit-
izens requires compromises and — by definition — a sacrifice of part of the
people’s individual freedom. In a scenario where the Social Contract is to be
transposed into a DLT protocol, will have to be taken into consideration the
fact that a state-run, permissioned DLT, while being certainly an innovative
mean of governance, would just (maybe) increase transparency and efficiency,
without, however, giving back to the people a part of the power originally dele-
gated. On the other hand, an open, permissionless DLT wouldn’t have the need
of a State (as originally envisioned by Nakamoto), but would therefore leave its
participants without the ability to enforce off-chain laws in relation to off-chain
events (e.g. judiciary power, damages and seizing of assets for compensation)
and, most importantly, to be subject to the developers that maintain the DLT
without the legal means to hold them accountable [39][3]; a circumstance that
would pose a serious threat to the effective decentralization of power.
As a matter of fact, more often than not, open source project of this magni-
tude are hosted on GitHub or similar platforms and rely on a group of developers
that either a) give their free time for the community or b) are actually paid by an
organization (e.g. The Ethereum Foundation). These developers/maintainers are
the de facto fiduciaries of a nominally authority-free, decentralized blockchain,
and as such hold a significant amount of decision-making power. The hard fork
that occurred in 2016 in response to the DAO hack is a perfect example of that:
the Community was split by a decision driven by core developers and main-
tainers. As a result, the Ethereum Classic blockchain was born [16]. Needless
to say that such an event, had it occurred in an institutionally adopted, state-
wide blockchain, would have had catastrophic consequences both socially and
economically.
Another problem that will arise is the one of the consensus algorithm. It
cannot be ignored that in some cases the hashrate (or mining power) tends to
be concentrated in just a few mining pools, making it easier to pursue attacks on
the chain. Hence arises the necessity of a consensus algorithm that could meet the
yet to be found needs of a structured, decentralized Democracy. Moreover, the
architecture of the protocol should make hard forks particularly disadvantageous
for the reasons that will be discussed in the next section.
These considerations bring us to the inevitable — yet obvious — conclusion
that in a Democratic society a balance needs to be struck. The ever-arising need
for disintermediation and decentralization of power must come to terms with the
Social Contract and vice versa. So, it will be of upmost importance to identify
the characteristics and features that a truly Democratic DLT should have.
am fascinated by Tim May’s crypto-anarchy. Unlike the communities traditionally
associated with the word ‘anarchy’, in a crypto-anarchy the government is not tem-
porarily destroyed but permanently forbidden and permanently unnecessary. It’s a
community where the threat of violence is impotent because violence is impossible,
and violence is impossible because its participants cannot be linked to their true
names or physical locations.”.
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2.2 Political, philosophical and legal implications
What would the political and philosophical consequences be, given the
adoption of a certain technology. In particular, whether and how the
separation of the Three Powers of a state could be affected or how new
checks and balances could be added to the constitutional equation.
The adoption of a DLT for the transposition of (part of) the Social Contract
may have significant political and philosophical implications. In fact, it could be
argued that the very birth of the Blockchain stands true to the latin phrase “ubi
societas, ibi ius” 2, where the internet users are the societas and the Blockchain
protocol is the ius. Of course, rules to govern the internet were already into
existence, but those rules were (are) given by existing institutions, while the
Blockchain could be considered a spontaneous event, a formalization of social
contract by technological means in a borderless, institution-less society.
The formalization of an existing social contract into a DLTs, would pose sig-
nificant questions. Once the rules are formalized, the underlying philosophical
and political motivation of said contract would become automatically effective
and — literally — self executing. Therefore, understanding the philosophical
nuances of the protocol becomes an upmost important matter. Whether we’ll be
governed by a Techno-Leviathan [37], or whether the adopted protocol will re-
flect Rousseau’s, Rawls’s [34] or Schmitt’s ideas is a question to be investigated.
Moreover, the consequences of such adoption could range from simply a more
efficient and transparent institutional ecosystem, to a drastic shift in the three-
powers balance. It needs to be taken into account the fact that Distributed
Ledger Technology will not be the only one that could potentially reshape
Democracy. Artificial Intelligence (AI) will play a fundamental role in our future,
too, especially with regards to automation in key aspects of Democracy. Ranging
from automation in the Public Sector, to legal drafting and automatic judicial
decision making, AIs will need to be put in check with a constitutional-level
tool. DLTs can represent this tool, acting as a safety valve, allowing for a direct
control of the automated processes and the flow of data to be fed to the AI, thus
ensuring that the sovereignty will still belong to the people.
Such a scenario would probably entail another important political and philo-
sophical consequence. A technologically empowered Democracy would mean a
lower latency between political decisions and their implementation. If citizens
are to be given back part of their originally delegated power, the consequences
of their choices would be more swift. Facing the almost immediate consequences
of their choices (or lack of them) would probably mean to hold the e-Democracy
stakeholders more accountable to themselves, thus pushing them to take a more
active role in society.
In addition, if DLTs could enable new means of direct democracy, new forms
of delegation of power could be imagined. As an example, it might be argued,
2 For the purpose of this work, we adhere to the theories proposed by Italian Jurist
Santi Romano as expressed in his famous book “L’ordinamento giuridico” in 1918
[36], re-edited in 1947 with footnotes acknowledging critiques to his view.
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the protocol could, in theory, give the citizens a kill-switch to cut the power off
their representatives that are mishandling it, when certain conditions are met.
This would allow for a safer delegation of constitutional powers, that might open
the gates to new, yet to be imagined forms of government.
However, some serious (potential) drawbacks cannot be ignored. As briefly
mentioned in the previous section, the state-wide protocol will probably have to
face with the issue of the so called hard forks — events where the protocol is
split in two, as a portion of its users decide to follow their own different rules.
Since hard forks are relatively easy to achieve (basically, a software upgrade),
this could seriously endanger the unity of a nation. A group of people of a specific
region, with strong political beliefs, could perform a schism from the mainland
with relative ease, with catastrophic consequences under every aspect.
On a more practical note, the adoption of DLTs in the public sector would
cross path and overlap with other issues related to the right to Internet access
and the open market [21], the protection and enjoyment of human rights on the
Internet [31] and, of course, its entanglement with data protection [20].
2.3 The implementation challenges
How the technology adopted will have to find ways to not give up the
underlying philosophical choices, by embroidering them into its core with
the checks and balances of each different constitutional power in both
institutional and every-day applications.
Once the DLTs protocol infrastructure will be chosen, adopted or devel-
oped, e-government and e-democracy services will have to be built upon it. In
some countries, such as Estonia, this is already a reality. However, in order to
truly reshape Democracy, implementation cannot stop at (relatively) simple, iso-
lated services: mirroring the separation of powers into the code, whilst ensuring
transparency, auditability and disintermediation requires something more. If the
DLT’s protocol can be compared to a constitution, the applications built upon
it (smart contracts or dApp) could be compared to the law [14]; however, this
approach has been fiercely criticized [32]. Hence arises the necessity of a complex
technological ecosystem. In particular, the crucial aspect of this ecosystem would
be to require, in order to function, besides human-readability [24], the least pos-
sible amount of Oracles. It could be argued, in fact, that one of the key aspects
of a technological democracy should be the empowerment of citizens through
disintermediation. Heavily relying on state-run Oracles would betray this ideal
and ultimately the core philosophy of Distributed Ledger Technologies.
In order to achieve this, each and every DLT-powered public service, DAO,
b2b, b2c or c2c smart contract will need to be justiciable. For justiciablity is
the true gatekeeper of each Democracy, courts will have to be empowered to
enforce their rulings over services, registries and smart contracts. However, the
Judiciary power should not be given a simple backdoor to the system, for this
would mean, again, the betrayal of the philosohpy of DLTs. Courts of justice
should rather be themselves dwellers of the Distributed Democracy, where their
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processes and trials — automated or not — will be ever more transparent and
auditable.
Taking as an example a Land Registry, if it is to be handled by a central
authority that would serve as an Oracle, while some benefits are surely given,
the control of it would remain centralized. On the other hand, however, some
off-chain, material and natural events need to be registered, such as the seizing
of assets due to civil liability. A solution that could be explored is the large-scale
adoption of interconnected, decentralized services in each of the Three Powers
of the State. In the aforementioned example, a Land Registry would be able to
register the seizing of a citizen’s tokenized asset if — and only if — a judicial
proceeding that took place in the very same DLT had as its parties the very
same stakeholder and as subject the seizing of that specific tokenized asset.
The complexity of the proposed ecosystem would probably mean that a state-
wide DLT ecosystem will be comprised of several, interconnected protocols, since,
for instance, some aspects of Democracy require different levels of transparency
(e.g. in e-voting, voters identity and vote cast must not be traceable). This means
that a major issue will have to be solved: atomic swap [25]. If atomic swap won’t
be solved, cross-protocol services will have to rely on off-chain Oracles — again,
betraying the core philosophy.
3 State of the art
The implications of the adoption of DLTs for governance has been studied by
many different authors [33]. Some authors display a fair degree of skepticism,
claiming that governing through the blockchain will only ever be at best effi-
ciency exercises [12]. Other authors explored the philosophical nuances of differ-
ent blockchain technologies, by analyzing the social contract theories that better
describe different technological and architectural choices [34]. Others have inves-
tigated whether a decentralized governance model could put the necessity of the
State into question, concluding that blockchain-based governance can be seen
more as an organizational theory rather than a stand alone political theory [2].
On the opposite side, other authors see DLTs as an institutional technology
that possesses constitutional properties [5][6][14]. Going further, other authors
explore the concept of decentralization as a political ideology, but at the same
time underline the gap between “the forms and extent of decentralization as pre-
scribed by the ideology, and the practical forms in which it manifests in various
blockchain networks” [8]. As a matter of fact, some Authors have questioned
the actual level of decentralization of DLTs, casting light over issues that tend
to be overlooked, such as the shift of trust from institutions to the coders and
the nodes that develop and run the network [39], and showed how there are
quite often occasions of re-centralization of power when it comes to taking core
decisions in software upgrades (such as the Bitcoin’s inflation bug of 2018) [40].
The investigation on the issue has been pushed forward in 2019 thanks to a
quantitative study of the decentralization of the governance structures of Bit-
coin and Ethereum, by scraping the open-source repositories associated with
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their respective codebases and improvement proposals to find the number of
people contributing to the code itself and to the overall discussion [3]. Finally,
other authors put through critical examination the concepts of code of law vs
code as law to identify whether, and to what extent, regulation by blockchain
will successfully avoid governance by conventional law, identifying three possible
way of these forces to interact with one another: (a) hostile evasion; (b) efficient
alignment; (c) alleviating transactional friction; [42].
Under a more practical point of view, the use of blockchain technology in
the public sector has been analyzed in a a thematic report prepared by the EU
Blockchain Observatory and Forum [27], and deeply assessed by a JRC report [1].
The EU studies show how the technology is still in its early stages of state-level
adoption, and serves more as an IT infrastructure rather than a groundbreaking
political innovation tool. Other EU projects are currently exploring new usages of
DLTs, such as a pilot project named European Financial Transparency Gateway,
based on blockhain technology (at the time of writing, just a demo) [17]. Also, in
2018 the European Blockchain Partnership was born, aiming at the cooperation
between member states for the “establishment of a European Blockchain Services
Infrastructure (EBSI) that will support the delivery of cross-border digital public
services, with the highest standards of security and privacy” [18]. However, again,
these project seem to lean more on the aspect of IT infrastructure rather than
a political game changer. Nonetheless, a 2017 study commissioned by the EU
Parliament Research Service (EPRS), has underlined the potential of DLTs to
be the groundbreaking technology it claims to be, for example, automating the
implementation of policies through a smart contract ecosystem [9]. In general,
“Rule as Code” is a concept that is gaining traction around the world [30].
Even though some holistic approach have been pursued [22], none seem to
properly address the problem of how to mirror the separation of powers in DLT-
powered eGovernment services. The problem has just been briefly mentioned by
two prominent authors [38][7], and a promising new DLT [28] seems to be aiming
in the correct direction. However, this aspect seems to be quite overlooked and
for this reason it is worthy of deeper analysis.
4 Methodology
The first step of this research project would be the technological assesment, in
order to weigh technological, legal, political and philosophical pros and cons of
public vs private DLTs, as above mentioned. In particular, the most wide spread
DLTs, such as Ethereum, IOTA, EOS, Tezos and, of course, the Hyperledger,
but also emerging new technologies such as STORE. An in-depth analysis of
their governance model will be of essence to single out the features that fit best
a truly decentralized Democracy.
The political and philosophical investigation would follow, in order to prop-
erly understand the drivers and the consequences of such a choice. This would
entail a preliminary study and comparison of different implementations of demo-
cratic values and ideals in existing and ideal political systems. The just men-
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tioned analysis is needed in order to establish a method of evaluation and as-
sessment of existing, work in progress and future projects that combine the use
of DLT in public governance (such as the European Blockchain Partnership and
Service Infrastructure and how it could push forward the Digital Single Market,
and if such evolution of the Public Sector would require disruptive changes under
a legislative point of view).
Also, surveys on the public perception of the issue by the tech and law com-
munities, together with the one of non-experts in the field, could prove to be
useful.
Finally, implementation challenges would be explored, having particular re-
gard of countries were DLTs are already used in some e-government services. In
particular, since justiciability plays a key role in democracies, a study of emerg-
ing DLTs that try to address the issue is due; moreover, experiments in building
justiciable services, having regard of existing civil and administrative procedural
laws could prove to be of essence for keeping the research grounded to reality.
5 Conclusions
This work had the goal to lay down a possible path for future research, singling
out the main questions that might be overlooked by current state of the art on
the open issues. The final and ambitious aim is to push the research forward
in order to build the foundations of a new way of thinking, that concurrently
tackles technological, juridical and political challenges. This new way of thinking
could be called Law Engineering, as it would serve as a tool to carefully balance,
in a precise and scientific way, the different needs that arise from the modern
and ever-evolving society.
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